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1956] RECENT BOOKS 583 
FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY. By J. w. 
Gough. London: Oxford University Press. 1955. Pp. ix, 229. $4. 
The author reveals that he was motivated in making the researches 
which resulted in this study by the difference he noted in the attitude 
toward fundamental law as exhibited by English and American writers. 
The latter, it is said, are inclined to treat the motion of fundamental law 
with greater respect than English writers who may frequently dismiss as his-
torical or political confusion arguments based on fundamental rights. Gough 
explains that this English reaction to the idea or theory of fundamental 
law probably stems from the belief that there is no precise meaning which 
may be attached to the term "fundamental law." 
Consequently, it is interesting to consider both of the problems suggested 
by Gough's work. The first question is whether or not there is a substan-
tial basis for resisting the view which is said to be prevalent among English 
thinkers on this matter. That is, may there be some fairly precise meaning 
which attaches to that still frequently heard political battle-cry "funda-
mental rights"? Gough's presentation and analysis of English historical 
sources and material results in the development of a rather surprisingly 
firm contour for the notion of "fundamental law." True, no sharp and 
unambiguous constitutional doctrines emerge, but then, even where there 
is fairly specific constitutional language embodied in an organic instru-
ment, as in America, sharp and unambiguous constitutional doctrines 
are seldom found. 
Particularly interesting in the book is the development of the mean-
ing of "fundamental law" in regard to the extent of parliamentary sover-
eignty. Gough first traces the evolution of the relevant doctrines and 
ideas from some of the earliest legal records and then examines in greater 
detail the development of the problem during the times of Coke, James 
I, and Charles I. In a legal system, such as that prevailing in England, 
where limitations upon judicial review make Parliament so much more 
powerful than the analogous governmental branch in the United States 
it is particularly important to determine the limitations, if any, which 
operate to restrain the exercise of sovereignity- And where, as in England, 
there is not available a specifically promulgated fundamental law to de-
termine the internal balances of power, it is especially helpful to discover 
what were the believed-to-be fundamental restrictions upon Parliament 
in the various stages of history. 
The second question, suggested also by Gough's remarks, concerns the 
author's indication as to the difference in attitude between American 
and English writers on the notion of fundamental law. This is hardly 
the place to develop the thesis, but I won4er if most recent or contemporary 
representative American writers do, in fact, exhibit greater respect for the 
idea of fundamental or natural law than is the case with their English 
counterparts. This is not to suggest that the American Constitution was 
not bred against a "higher law background," to use part of the title in 
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Corwin's well known Harvard Law Review articles.1 However, the in-
creased recognition that reliance upon or appeal to natural rights has 
been too often ineffective in securing the kind of interpersonal unanimity 
and understanding necessary for generally acceptable constitutional de-
velopment, has, I believe, resulted in a noticeable diminution in the re-
spect paid by many American writers to notions of fundamental or 
natural law. In addition, it has become ever clearer that appeal to labels 
like "natural law" may serve but to obfuscate issues which are otherwise 
relatively easy to discern. It requires no special talent to refill a bottle 
which formerly contained California red wine with a liquid that looks, 
smells, and indeed tastes like vodka. Like the American Constitution, 
that of Romania (art. 85) contains express guarantees of freedoms of 
speech and press. One may be tempted, therefore, to conclude that in 
both countries those freedoms are fundamental law. But the labels do 
not change the contents of the bottle: in the United States we have the 
line of cases including Near v. Minnesota;2 in Romania they have decree 
no. 583, article I of which requires registration with the police of all 
"typewriters and duplicating machines ... as well as material necessary 
for duplication .... "3 
My suggestion that perhaps American writers are according less and 
less respect to the notion of fundamental law is not intended to derogate 
from Gough's thesis that there.are discernible in English history some fairly 
definite indications as to the· meaning of fundamental law in England. 
Rather, I intended to suggest that perhaps recent English writers should 
not be rebuked for abandoning concern with the notion of a fundamental 
law and for turning instead to other devices for ascertaining and fixing 
the relationships between a sovereign and its subjects. 
Samuel I. Shuman, 
Associate Professor of Law, 
Wayne University Law School 
1 Corwin, "The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law," 42 
HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 149, 365 (1928, 1929), recently reprinted as a Great Seal book, Cornell 
Univ. Press, 1955. 
2283 U.S. 691, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931). 
3 See BuL. OFFICIAL, No. 51 aune 9, 1950). 
